Abstract: This paper is to examine empirically the impact of micro-credit on poverty in Bangladesh. Unlike previous studies, the focus is on both objective and subjective poverty and particular attention is paid to the length of time programme participants have had access to micro-credit. A household-level survey (N = 954) was carried out aimed at collecting information about individuals receiving micro-credit from the three main micro-credit organisations in Bangladesh (Grameen Bank, BRAC and ASA). A logit regression analysis supports two main findings. The first is that microcredit is associated with both lower objective and subjective poverty. The second is that the impact of micro-credit on poverty is particularly strong for about six years with some levelling off after that point.
Introduction
It is often argued that the financial sector in low-income countries has failed to serve the poor. With respect to the formal sector, banks and other financial institutions generally require significant collateral, have a preference for high income and high loan clients, and have lengthy and bureaucratic application procedures. With respect to the informal sector, money-lenders usually charge excessively high interest rates, tend to undervalue collateral, and often allow racist and/or sexist attitudes to guide lending decisions. The failure of the formal and informal financial sectors to provide affordable credit to the poor is often viewed as one of the main factors that reinforces the vicious circle of economic, social and demographic structures that ultimately cause poverty.
As a partial response to this failure, there has been significant growth in what can be termed "micro-credit" over the past two decades. Micro-credit is essentially the dispersion of small collateral-free loans to jointly liable borrowers in groups in order to foster income generation and poverty reduction through enhancing selfemployment. Perhaps the best-known micro-credit institution is the pioneering Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. However, the Grameen model has been replicated in many countries (including high-income countries such as the United States). One estimate suggests that over 10 million households worldwide are serviced by microcredit (see Morduch, 1999) . In addition, there is a view amongst key decision-makers that micro-credit has played an important role in the reduction of poverty. This optimism is reflected in the outcome of the Microcredit Summit held in 1997 where policy-makers, NGOs, charitable foundations and practitioners enthusiastically pledged to reach 100 million households with micro-credit by the year 2005, at an anticipated cost of some $20 billion (see Microcredit Summit Report, 1997).
The empirical evidence on the impact of micro-credit on poverty is very mixed (see for example, Edgecomb and Barton, 1998; Morduch, 1998 Morduch, , 1999 Schrieder and Sharma, 1999; Sebstad and Chen, 1996; Coleman, 1999; Hossain, 1988 Hossain, , 1998 . Some impact/evaluation studies have found that access to credit by the poor has a large positive effect on living standards. However, other studies have found that poverty is not reduced through micro-credit-poor households simply become poorer through the additional burden of debt. Since more money for micro-credit in practise means less money for other programmes with similar aims, it is extremely important to carefully evaluate whether or not "small loans for poor people" in fact works.
With this in mind, the purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the impact of micro-credit on poverty in Bangladesh. Unlike previous studies, the focus is on both objective and subjective poverty and particular attention is paid to the length of time programme participants have had access to micro-credit. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is a brief discussion of the three main organisations involved in micro-credit in Bangladesh. Section 3 outlines in some detail the survey of micro-credit participant households that was carried out. Section 4 describes the statistical models that were used to evaluate the impact of micro-credit on objective and subjective poverty. Results are presented in Section 5. Conclusions follow in Section 6.
Institutional Background: Micro-credit in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has experienced rapid growth in the micro-credit sector since 1990.
Prior to 1990, only a handful of organisations were in operation. Many NGOs adopted and built on the experience of the Grameen Bank. Some of these NGOs experimented with the Grameen Bank micro-credit delivery system at the beginning and gradually they developed their own micro-credit delivery system (such as BRAC and ASA, see below). Currently, more than 1,000 NGOs operate micro-credit programmes in Bangladesh (see Rahman, 1999) . The contribution of many of these NGOS to microcredit disbursement is very small. Table 1 presents some comparative information relating to the activities of these three organisations.
<<<< Table 1 About Here >>>> The Grameen Bank evolved from research project aimed at identifying the causes of poverty carried out by Professor Muhammad Yunus. He found that capital constraints had been forcing women to sell their handicraft products to input providers at prices that were much lower than market prices. He concluded that a lack of smallscale capital in rural areas, needed for income-generating activities, was one of the main causes of poverty. This experience led him to experiment with a loan program targeted at poor people without collateral. In 1983, through a government statute, the Grameen Bank became an official financial institution. It is now regulated by the Central Bank of Bangladesh, and is the largest player in the micro-credit sector. The Grameen Bank receives funds from both the Central Bank and commercial banks (about 75 per cent of the total), along with contributions from international donors.
The Grameen Bank pioneered (and continues to employ) the "group-lending model". Five people with similar socio-economic status (usually from the same village), form a "group". Each member presents himself or herself as a guarantor of other members' loans. This system of "joint liability" replaces the more traditional collateral system used in the formal financial sector. If any member defaults the whole group becomes ineligible to receive additional loans. In this sense, each member of the group is responsible and liable for other members' repayment of loans. Loans are repaid in weekly instalments, with each instalment being equal to 2 per cent of the principal.
In 2000, membership in the Grameen Bank was about 2.3 million, with a cumulative loan disbursement of about $3.2 billion. It operates in over 40,000 villages, covering nearly half of the total land area of Bangladesh. In 2000, members had a total savings balance of $83.2 million, and the recovery rate of was near 89 per cent (see Table 1 ). Currently, in terms of cumulative loan disbursement the Grameen Bank is the largest micro-credit organisation in Bangladesh. (Jain, 1999; Rutherford, 1995) 
Sample Survey
The analysis reported below is based on a household-level survey of microcredit programme participants carried out from January to May 1999 (N = 954 households). The data was collected through face-to-face interviews following a four stage sampling design. Bangladesh is divided into 64 administrative districts. Two criteria were used to reduce the number of eligible districts. The first was that it had to one of those relatively close to Dhaka. This restriction was imposed simply because of time and budget constraints. The second was that the district was not one severely affected by the 1998 flood. This restriction was imposed because the devastation and deprivation created by this tragic event would mask any underlying impact of microcredit. These criteria narrowed the number of eligible districts down to five, of which one, Comilla, was selected. Comilla lies about 70 km south-east of Dhaka and has a mainly rural population of about five million inhabitants.
In the second stage, a list of the "branches" of Grameen Bank, BRAC and ASA in Comilla was constructed. A branch usually consists of 50 to 60 "centres", with each centre having 30 to 50 members. From this list, branches that had been in existence for at least eight years were selected. This restriction resulted in four branches of the Grameen Bank being identified, of which two were randomly selected. No branch of BRAC or ASA met this duration criterion. However, there were seven branches that had been in existence for five or more years (four BRAC and three ASA). From this group, one BRAC and one ASA branch was randomly selected. The two Grameen Bank branches were about 4.5 km away from Comilla Town. This distance was used as a selection criterion to choose a newly-established branch (i.e. in existence for less than one year) for some comparative work not reported in this paper. Only one branch met this criterion and was selected. In the third stage, centres were selected from these five branches. In each of the "old" (8+ years) Grameen branches there were 60 branches, from which 27 were randomly selected. In the "new" Grameen branch (less than one year old) there were 26 centres from which 20 were randomly selected. The
In total, 144 centres were selected from a total of 246.
In the fourth and final stage of sampling, individual households were selected.
Lists of member households were obtained from each of the branch offices. As mentioned above, we are particularly interested in the impact of programme duration.
Therefore, longer duration households were over-sampled. The households on these lists were grouped into four duration categories: (1) Less than two years; (2) 2-4 years; (3) 5-7 years; and (4) 8+ years. In the case of the two "old" Grameen branches, two households were randomly selected from each duration category. This resulted in 216 households from each branch, or 432 "old" Grameen households in total being included in the sample (i.e. 2 branches x 27 centres per branch x 4 duration categories x 2 households per duration category). Since member households of the newlyestablished Grameen branch by definition have durations less than one year, simple random sampling was used to select five households from each of the 20 centres, resulting in 100 "new" Grameen households being included in the sample. None of the BRAC and ASA branches had been in existence for eight years. For both, two households were randomly selected from each of three remaining duration categories.
This resulted in 210 households from each branch being included in the sample (i.e.
35 centres x 3 duration categories x 2 households per duration category).
The sample consisted of 952 households. In total, information was collected for 432 member households of two "old" branches of Grameen; for 100 member households of a "new" branch of Grameen; and for 210 member households for a branch each of BRAC and ASA. Because of missing information on some of the key variables, 43 households had to be dropped, which reduced the size of the useable sample to 909 households. Table 2 (Column 1) presents some descriptive information relating to the sample. If we classify "new members" as those households who have been a member of a micro-credit programme for less than one year, then such cases make up 29.2% (N=265) of the sample. It is also important to note that 17% (N = 45) of these new members had not at time of the interview received the cash for the loan that had been agreed (although this was expected shortly). "Old members" (i.e.
households with programme duration greater than one year) make up 70.8% (N = 644) of the sample. Given the sample strategy followed, it is difficult to judge how representative it is. However, it is our belief the information collected does capture the diversity of the micro-credit experience in Bangladesh and at the same time provides a meaningful vehicle for exploring how programme duration impacts on poverty.
<<<< Table 2 About Here >>>> The survey collected detail information on a variety of factors. For example, demographic information (age, sex, marital status, etc.) and socio-economic information (education, employment, food consumption, expenditure on health, etc.) was collected for all household members. Detailed village-level information was also collected, such as distance to nearest primary school, secondary school, market and district headquarters, along with variables describing village infrastructure, such as the presence of schools, markets, irrigation systems, roads, electricity, etc.
Information relating to the size of loan received, date of joining and other membership characteristics was provided by branch officials and matched to the data.
As mentioned above, two poverty lines are used. The first is an objective poverty line. It is based on the cost associated with obtaining a minimum daily "adult" requirement of 2,112 calories (including 58 grams of protein). Equivalence scales were used (GOB, 1998) to adjust this amount for age differences, with the age-specific weights being: age 0-3=0.41; age 3-6=0.53; age 6-9=0.67; age 9-12=0.86; age 12-17=0.94; age 17-29=1.0; age 29-59=0.94 and age 59+=0.83. This implies a poverty line of 147 Taka per week, or about $US2.75 per week. The second is a subjective poverty line. A household was defined as being poor if the household head answered "yes" to the following question: "Do you consider your family poor based on your current yearly income?" Table 2 shows the rates of poverty based on these poverty lines (columns 2 and 3). For the entire sample, the objective poverty rate (P o ) is 54.6 per cent with the subjective poverty rate (P s ) being higher at 60.2 per cent. It is also important to note that there is a clear poverty differential between "new" and "old" members. The P o rate for new members is 65.3 per cent compared to 50.2 per cent for old members.
Likewise the P s rate for new members is 90.2 per cent compared to 47.9 per cent for old members. Taken at face value, these simple summary statistics suggest that both objective and subjective poverty is lower amongst those who have received microcredit.
Examination of the summary statistics presented in Table 2 also suggests that both objective and subjective poverty decline with programme duration. Fitting a linear trend line in programme duration suggests that objective poverty falls by about 2.5 per cent per programme year. Likewise, subjective poverty falls by about 6.5 per cent per programme year. Although this provides some evidence that poverty appears to fall with programme duration, these estimates do not take into consideration other factors that might determine poverty. It is therefore necessary to control for these other factors before the impact of micro-credit can be gauged with increased confidence.
Statistical Model
In order to control for some of these factors, logit regression is used. This model is of the general form:
where: "P" is a dummy variable coded "1" if the household is poor and coded "0" if not; "X P " is a vector of micro-credit programme variables; "X H " is a vector of household and individual socio-economic characteristics; and "X V " is a vector of village-level characteristics. In the logit model "" follows a logistic distribution. The above model is estimated for both objective and subjective poverty.
This model is estimated using three different specifications of the micro-credit programme variables that attempt to capture the impact of programme duration on poverty. The first is a simple linear specification:
where "L" is a dummy variable coded "1" if the micro-credit loan has been received and coded "0" if not; and "D" is the length of time (measured in months) the household has been in receipt of micro-credit (months programme duration). The second is a quadratic specification:
which will allow a test of non-linearity in the relationship between poverty and programme duration. The third specification replaces the programme duration variables with a series of dummy variables representing ten separate duration categories: where "D 6 " is a dummy variable coded "1" if programme duration is less than 6 months and coded "0" if not; "D 12 " is a dummy variable coded "1" if programme duration is between 7-12 months and coded "0" if not; etc.
It is important to note that the sample includes 45 "new member" households who had not at the time of the interview received their loan. That is, they had been applied for and had been selected for a loan but had not received the cash. One of the problems associated with evaluating the impact of micro-credit on poverty relates to the "self-selection" of programme participants (see Coleman, 1999) . If programme participants are not a random sub-sample of the more general target population (i.e. the poor), then models estimated using information only on participants would likely lead to biased estimates of the impact of micro-credit on poverty. Table 3 About Here >>>>
Results
The key coefficients of the estimated logit equations are summarised in Table   4 . Columns (1)- (3) are for objective poverty while Columns (4)-(6) are for subjective poverty. For brevity, only the coefficients for the variables included in the programme duration specifications are shown. The complete set of estimates is available from the authors upon request. From a statistical point of view, the coefficients are better determined for subjective poverty than for objective poverty (as indicated partially by the ratio of the coefficient to its standard error given in parentheses). It is also interesting to note that in none of the models is the "L" variable statistically significant at the conventional threshold levels, providing some evidence that selection bias may not be a problem. As a general remark, the estimates suggest that micro-credit does appear to be associated with lower objective and subjective poverty, with both poverty rates declining with programme duration.
<<<< Table 4 About Here >>>> In order to demonstrate this last finding more intuitively, Figures 1 and 2 show the relationship between poverty and programme implied by the estimates. Figure 1 is for objective poverty while Figure 2 is for subjective poverty. For convenience, programme duration is measured in years. Two steps were required to construct these "adjusted poverty" rates. In the first step, the estimated coefficients were used to "predict" each household's poverty rate given each household's individual values of the control variables given in Table 3 . In the second step, these values were averaged across all households at progressively increasing programme durations in order to get duration-specific "mean" poverty rates that net-out the effects of other variables that affect poverty.
<<<< Figures 1 and 2 about Here >>>> Figure 1 suggests that micro-credit is associated with lower levels of objective poverty. The predicted objective poverty rate at zero duration is around 65 per cent.
After eight years of exposure to micro-credit, this rate declines to about 45 per cent.
This suggests a fall of about 30 per cent, or an average annual rate of reduction in the area of 3.5 to 4.0 per cent. Figure 2 suggests that micro-credit is also associated with lower levels of subjective poverty. The predicated subjective poverty rate at zero duration is about 85 per cent. After eight years of exposure, this rate declines to about 45 percent. This implies a fall of over 50 per cent, or an average annual rate of reduction of around 5 per cent.
The examination of Figures 1 and 2 suggest that there is some levelling off of poverty reducing effect of micro-credit after about six years. This levelling off is well illustrated by the duration specification based on dummy variables, which is also evident in the quadratic specification. This is particularly the case with respect to subjective poverty where the "turning point" of the estimated U-shaped relationship between poverty and programme duration is about six years.
Conclusions
The main objective of the micro-credit movement in Bangladesh (and elsewhere) is to reduce poverty. Bangladesh is a poor country with a relatively long history of micro-credit lending. Despite this there is still considerable debate in the development economics community concerning the effect of micro-credit on poverty.
The analysis carried out in this paper does suggest that micro-credit borrowing is associated with lower poverty. However, the effectiveness of micro-credit as a real poverty alleviation tool does not depend on its short-run impacts. Giving people money may raise them out of poverty for a short period of time but when the money is spent they fall back into poverty. For micro-credit to permanently reduce poverty it must have a long-run impact. Micro-credit is not a short-run subsidy. Its aim is to lead to a sustainable increase in a household's ability to create wealth. The analysis presented in this paper provides some evidence that the effect of micro-credit on poverty is particularly strong for about six years with some levelling off after that point.
After eight years of programme experience, the estimated objective and subjective poverty rates are still in the area of 45 per cent-high by any standard. This suggests that micro-credit organisations should reconsider and adapt their microcredit technologies to improve the longer-run poverty reduction capacity of micro-credit.
This seems critical if these organisations want to make a significant contribution to achieving the international development goal of reducing poverty by 50 per cent by the year 2015. It also suggests that the government, in unison with micro-credit intervention, should also apply other techniques of poverty reduction to solve the poverty problem in Bangladesh. 
Area1
Dummy coded "1" for Sholownol Burichong area and "0" otherwise.
20.1% --

Area2
Dummy coded "1" for Jagat Pur area and "0" otherwise.
4.4% --Area3
Dummy coded "1" for East Gouri Pur area and "0" otherwise.
21.6% --Area4
Dummy coded "1" for West Gouri Pur area and "0" otherwise.
23.8% --Area5
Dummy coded "1" for Chandina area and "0" otherwise.
19.1% --Area6
Dummy coded "1" for Bijoy Pur area and "0" otherwise. 11.0% -- 
Notes:
(1) Ratio of coefficient to its standard error shown in parentheses.
(2) Equations also include control variables shown in Table 3 but coefficients not reported. 
